Terrorist organizations have experienced several transformations, in forms of merger and disintegration. These transformations came as a reflection of regional and global factors that affected the global terrorism landscape. It had several repercussions on the parent organization and the organizations resulting from the processes of merger and disintegration, in addition to its impact on the effectiveness of counter-terrorism efforts. The alliance between terrorist organizations has been a continuous and recurring state with different interactions and mechanisms. These alliances occur in a context of constant competition between terrorist organizations, which often leads to the end of alliances with disintegration and split to the point of conflict and competition.
The nature of alliances between terrorist organizations and the repercussions of such alliances is what calls for this study as it seeks to reveal determinants affecting the merger/disintegration landscape of terrorist organizations worldwide, as well as reasons for terrorist organizations resorting to such inter-linkages, in addition to identifying the developments in sush alliances through the analysis of the most prominent models in different regions of the world, including the Arab region, Africa, Asia, and Europe.
The study reveals that most prominent reasons for terrorist organizations resorting to this type of cooperative relations with other terrorist organizations are seeking to achieve security cooperation through security training, intelligence exchange, and the implementation of joint attacks; benefiting from the networks of external relations of terrorist organizations that will be allying with, and seeking survival in cases where the terrorist organization faces severe pressures that may affect its survival.
As for the repercussions of such alliances on terrorist organizations, the more they bring advantages, they have costs. The desire to expand influence often clashed with some of the intellectual and ideological constants of terrorist organizations, which prompted these organizations, in several cases, to abandon those constants. In the case of local alliances, the goals of the allied organizations are close to a large extent, so that the enemy is common, and the goal pursued is one goal, but it does not necessarily happen in the case of cross-border alliances, in which some constants may be abandoned in exchange for pragmatic considerations.
Cases of merger and disintegration between terrorist organizations had important implications for the security landscape. On the one hand, the security landscape has become increasingly complex, especially in the case of African and Asian, where alliances have reinforced the capacity of domestic terrorist organizations, becoming more dangerous to impose increased security threats as well as impacting the effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies based on several related scenarios discussed in the study. The security repercussions of such merger and disintegration of terrorist organizations were represented in the emergence of terrorist organizations / groups that are more deadly and extremist than the parent organization, the emergence of hybrid (terroristcriminal) entities, and the geographical concentration of terrorism, which affects different dimensions of national security.
And based on our review of the most prominent features and forms of mergers /disintegration between terrorist organizations in the four regions,
we reached the following conclusions:
1- Many terrorist organizations in all regions witnessed different degrees of alliances, which were sometimes governed by pragmatic considerations and at other times by ideological factors.
2- The alliances between terrorist organizations are characterized by overlapping ethnic and criminal dimensions, which complicates the map of terrorist alliances in Africa and Asia.
3- Several regional and international transformations, led to major changes in nature of alliance through a continuous state of splits within terrorist organizations, as the principles governing alliances changed, they became more pragmatic, more fluid, and less permanent.
4- Changes occurred in the geographical map of terrorism through the concentration of terrorist organizations in alternative areas, which in turn affected scenes of merger and disintegration and led to the emergence of organizations that are more violent and deadly than the parent organization such as ISIS.
5- Despite the efforts made in counter-terrorism operations, whether at the local, regional, or international level, terrorist organizations in most of the regions have shown great flexibility in adaptation and resistance while targeted by counterterrorism operations; as they resort to continuous changes in its strategy and behavior in the Arab region, Africa, and Asia, while terrorist organizations in Europe have shown less resistance.
The study reached the following recommendations:
1- Including a study of the network of terrorist organizations alliances into counter terrorism efforts at local and international levels, due to the significant role these alliances play on counter terrorism efforts, which can be done through establishing a decision support unit to study the dynamic map of alliances between terrorist organizations.
2- Inviting Arab research centers concerned with terrorism issues to contribute in creating a database on alliances/ splits between terrorist organizations worldwide, with periodic and continuous updates of the database, which can be through Naif Arab University for Security Sciences.
3- Evaluating the effectiveness of “targeting of terrorist organization leadership” as a strategic tool in counter terrorism by addressing several repercussions of this strategy represented in the emergence of more scenes of merger and disintegration between terrorist organizations, the increased in terrorist activity, and the flexibility of the current terrorist organizations in cases of targeting leaders.
4- Focusing efforts of counter terrorism on resource -rich areas, as they are considered as the most attractive areas for terrorist alliances to provide financial resources.
5- Developing predictive studies in the field of counter terrorism, that contribute to tracking changes in the movements and behaviors of terrorist organizations, in addition to revealing caracteristics of terrorist organizations in light of the current political and economic changes, which will help the decision -makers draw future paths of terrorist organizations and proactive response to their movements.
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